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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

This memorandum examines how the features of the legal relationship between
civilian superiors and their subordinates can make the superior criminally responsible for
war crimes. Superiors are made criminally liable for the conduct of their subordinates by
the doctrine of command responsibility. The doctrine is codified in Article 6 (3) of the
statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR Statute”).1 Article 6 (3) holds
superiors criminally responsible for failing to take necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent, halt, or punish acts they knew or had reason to know had been, or were about to
be committed by subordinates.2 This memorandum focuses on the civilian superiorsubordinate relationship because civilian leaders were instrumental in the genocide in
Rwanda.3 In this context, it is important to examine how the superior-subordinate
relationship, the “knew or had reason to know” standard, and the “failure to take
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or punish” have been interpreted by courts
after World War II, and by the Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
This memorandum concludes:
(1) Proving the nexus between a civilian superior and the criminal conducts of their
subordinates depends significantly on the prosecution’s ability to prove how the
superior exercised de facto command over the subordinates.4
________________________________

1

Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, Art. 6 (3), S/RES/955 (1994) (Annex), 8 November
1994, cited in 2 Virginia Morris and Michael P. Scharf, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
RWANDA 5 (1998) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1.]
2

Id.

3

Prosecutor v. Kayishema, No. ICTR-95-1-T (ICTR May 21, 1999) at para 501 [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 8.]

4

Id. at para 354
1

The goal of such an inquiry is to discover the degree of effective control the superior
possessed over the subordinates.5 In order to prove the superior-subordinate relationship
it is therefore necessary to consider the de jure and de facto aspects of an individual’s
authority.6
(2) The “knew or had reason to know” standard is invoked if the superior has been put on
notice that offenses have occurred, or are about to take place.7 An example of the type of
notice sufficient would be the receipt of reports that crimes had been committed. The
knew or had reason to know standard arises from the duty of a superior to be aware of the
actions of his or her subordinates. 8
(3) Assuming the first two elements have been proven, if the superior has failed to
prevent or punish the acts of subordinates, the superior’s inaction will be understood to
be an element in their criminal culpability. Defendants who have been charged under the
doctrine of command responsibility have argued that they were coerced by their own
superiors, or that they were powerless because of a chaotic political environment.9 Such
arguments are used as a defense for the failure to take necessary and reasonable measures
to prevent or punish the acts of their subordinates.10 Courts have recognized that while
___________________________
5 Prosecutor v. Delalic (hereinafter Celebici), No. IT-96-21-T (ICTY Nov. 16, 1998) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]
6

Kayishema, supra at para. 351 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8]

7

Celebici, supra at para 380 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10]

8

Timothy Wu and Yong-Sun (Jonathan) Kang, Criminal Liability for the Actions of Subordinates-the
Doctrine of Command Responsibility and its Analogues in United States Law, 38 HARVARD
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 272, (1997) at 273 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 19]
9

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No.ICTR-96-4-T(ICTR Sept. 2, 1998) at para 187 [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 7]

10

Id. at para 187
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superiors cannot be expected to single-handedly overcome an unfolding genocide, they
are the representatives of public trust and responsibility,11 and have duties under
international law to take measures “within material possibility” to uphold such duties. 12

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Between April and June of 1994, members of the Hutu tribe in Rwanda engaged
in the open and systematic killing of members of the Tutsi tribe.13 Many people who held
positions of authority and influence in civilian society participated in the killing, and
encouraged others to kill.14 The system of civil administration in Rwanda is based on that
of Civil Law countries.15 Many individuals who held positions of authority within the
system of civil administration were involved in the genocide. Clement Kayishema, a
Prefect, Alfred Musema, a Factory Director, and Jean-Paul Akayesu, a bourgmestre, were
charged under the doctrine of command responsibility.

________________________
11

Timothy Wu and Yong-Sun (Jonathan) Kang, supra at 290 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 19]

12

Celebici, supra note 4 at para 390 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10]

13

Virginia Morris and Michael P. Scharf, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA (1998)
at 54 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 23]

14

Id. at 53

15

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 9 at para 62 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7]
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III. LEGAL DISCUSSION

A. ESTABLISHING THE SUPERIOR-SUBORDINATE RELATIONSHIP
The ICTR statute was created by the United Nations Security Council as a response to the
events in Rwanda.16 Under the statute, the criminal responsibility of a superior arises
from proof of the following elements:
(i)

the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship

(ii)

the superior knew or had reason to know the criminal act had been committed or
was about to be committed

(iii)

the superior failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or
punish17
The trial of Zdravko Mucic and his associates by the Tribunal for the Former

Yugoslavia was the first time since World War II that an international tribunal had
convicted a superior under command responsibility.18 Known as the Celebici case, this
decision is an important precedent for the Rwanda Tribunal because it deals
comprehensively with the legal duties of civilian superiors acting in improvised
command structures. 19 The Celebici prison camp was used by Croat forces to house
_____________________________
16

Major Michael L. Smidt, Yamashita, Medina, and Beyond: Command Responsibility in Contemporary
Military Operations, 164 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 155 (2000) at 206 [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 16.]
17

Celebici, supra note 4 at para 346 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10]

18

Ann B. Ching, Evolution of the Command Responsibility Doctrine in Light of the Celebici Decision of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 25 NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMERCIAL REGULATION 167, (1999) at 186 [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 12]
19

Id. at 195-198
4

Serb prisoners. 20 Camp Commander Zdravko Mucic was convicted under command
responsibility. 21 The court held that the doctrine applied because he was the de facto
commander of the Celebici prison camp, and he exercised de facto authority over the
camp. 22 The Trial Chamber found that the use of the generic term “superior” in Article
7(3) of the ICTY, identical to Article 6(3) of the ICTR, indicates that it’s applicability
extends beyond military commanders, to include civilian authorities. 23 The Court defined
“superior” not as a formal designation, but as “the actual possession, or non-possession
of powers of control over the actions of subordinates.” 24 The Court defined actual
control as a material ability to prevent and punish the actions of subordinates, and forms
of influence that did not include such a material ability were insufficient to implicate
command responsibility. 25 The degree of control civilian superiors possess must in this
sense be similar to that of military commanders.26 The ability to prevent and punish the

_____________________________
20

Id. at 187

21

Greg R. Vetter, Command Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors in the International Criminal Court,
25 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 89 (2000) note 149 at 113 [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 18]

22

Id. at 113 n.150

23

The Chamber noted that this interpretation was supported by the explanation of the vote made by the
representative of the United States after the adoption of Security Council Resolution 827 on the
establishment of the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia, that individual criminal responsibility arises
where the failure of a superior, whether political or military to take reasonable steps to prevent or punish
crimes by persons under his authority. This speech is reproduced in Virginia Morris and Michael P. Scharf,
AN INSIDERS GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUANL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA VOL. 2
(1995) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 24]
24

Celebici, supra note 4 at para 370 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10]

25

Greg R. Vetter, supra, note 21 at 117 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 18]

26

Id. at 117 n.167

5

acts of subordinates is a hallmark of the authority of military commanders.
The case against Deputy Commander Hazim Delic 27 illustrates how the genuine
ability of an individual to prevent and punish distinguishes their authority from other
forms of influence. Several former Celebici prisoners testified that they saw Delic give
orders, and exercise apparent influence over the guards, in the form of personal
intimidation and bullying, 28 but the Tribunal found the evidence tended to show only
that he helped organize day-to-day activities, and did not clearly show that “he could
issue orders and punish and prevent the criminal acts of subordinates.” 29 It is not
sufficient to produce evidence that indicates a vague or general superiority, especially
lower down the hierarchy of civilian authority.30 There is a difference between having
the latitude and opportunity to influence subordinates, and having the authority to prevent
or punish the acts of subordinates. The latter is an actual authority that can be equated
with de jure power.31
______________________________________

27

The Appeals Chamber made a distinction between two aspects of his authority, citing the Roechling case.
The accused was the President of the Directorate and works manager of steel plants. He was Herman
Roechling’s son-in-law. The Appeals Chamber disagreed with the Prosecution that “sufficient authority”
for command responsibility can be engendered by “powers of persuasion” alone. (Celebici Appeal at para
262) His de facto control over workers, and contacts with the Gestapo, as a civilian industrial leader, was
seen by the Appeals Chamber as the accurate method of establishing superior responsibility. (Celebici
appeal at para 263)
The Appeals Chamber agreed with the Trial Chamber’s definition of superior-subordinate relationship for
the purposes of de facto command, explicitly “effective control” (at para 197) The Appeals Chamber noted
although de facto and de jure command can take different forms, “a de facto superior must be found to
wield substantially similar powers of control over subordinates to be held criminally responsible for their
acts.” (at para 197) On the issue of what kind of influence establishes the effective control necessary to the
superior-subordinate relationship, the Appeals Chamber concluded that forms of influence “in any sense”
falling short of effective control would not suffice. (at para 266) See The Roechling Case, 14 Trials of War
Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunal Under Control Council Law No. 10 at 1061
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5]

28

Ann B. Ching, supra note 18 at 202 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 12]

29

Id. at 194

30

Id. at 202

31

Id. at 202
6

An example of how the Rwanda Tribunal has weighed the value of de jure and de
facto powers can be found in the case of Jean-Paul Akayesu. He was prosecuted under
Article 6 (3) of the ICTR statute.32 He was the bourgmestre of the Taba commune from
April 1993 until June 1994. 33 The bourgmestre is the chief administrator of the
commune . 34 As an elected official, he was in charge of the economy, markets, and the
social life of the commune .35 The de jure powers of a bourgmestre are similar to the
maire in France or bourgmestre in Belgium.36 He can hire and fire communal
employees,37 he has disciplinary and organizational authority over communal (civilian)
police 38 and he can request the Gendarmerie Nationale to maintain public order in times
of crisis.39 The bourgmestre is the most powerful figure in the commune, 40 and his de
facto powers are appreciable.41 The Tribunal found that his de facto authority was
significantly greater than his de jure authority.42

____________________________________

32

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 9 Count 12 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7]

33

Id. at para 48

34

Id. at para 54

35

Id. at para 54

36

Id. at para 61

37

Id. at para 62

38

Id. at para 63

39

Id. at para 68

40

Id. at para 77

41

Id. at para 77

42

Id. at para 77

7

On the question of whether individual criminal responsibility under Article 6(3)
applied to people with civilian authority, the Akayesu Chamber noted Judge Rolings
dissent in the case of the former Foreign Minister of Japan, Koki Hirota, who was found
criminally responsible by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo
Tribunal) for the “Rape of Nanking”:
Generally speaking, a Tribunal should be very careful in holding
civil government officials responsible for the behavior of the army in the
field…considerations of both law and policy, of both justice and
expediency, indicate that this responsibility should only be recognized in
a very restricted sense.43
The Chamber concluded that the application of individual criminal responsibility to
civilians “remains contentious.” 44 The Chamber held that it had to be shown that
Akayesu was helping the Government in its war against the RPF,45 and that the evidence
of the assistance he gave the military did not establish that he actively participated in the
war effort.46 For this reason, he did not incur individual criminal responsibility under
Article 6(3).47
The emphasis the Trial Chamber placed on Judge Rolings’dissent in Hirota was
misplaced. It is clear that Hirota was found guilty of war crimes for being derelict in his
duty to attempt to stop the starvation, torture and murder of thousands of the inhabitants
of Nanking, not for his nominal status within the Japanese government. His guilt lay not
_______________________________________________

43

Id. at para 490

44

Id. at para 490

45

Id. at para 642. The RPF is an acronym for the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the Tutsi army. See VOL.1
Virginia Morris and Michael P. Scharf, supra note 13 at 50-51 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 23]

46

Id. at para 642

47

Id. at para 644
8

in his mere status, but in his failure to stop behavior that was obviously wrong. The
Akayesu Chamber examined the same body of customary and statutory law as the
Yugoslavia Trial Chamber had in Celebici, but decided that despite Akayesu’s authority
and control within the Taba commune, his status as a civilian was not sufficiently
analogous to the Celebici Camp Commander, Mucic, who could more readily be viewed
as a military commander.48 The Akayesu Chamber concluded that evidence of his formal
relationship with the Government’s war objectives was more important than evidence of
his relationship with his subordinates. Yet the actions of his subordinates in carrying out
genocide materially furthered the Government’s war objectives.49 The Celebici approach
makes more sense because a superior’s relationship with his subordinates is more
relevant to the proof of command responsibility than the superior’s nominal status within
a military or para-military command structure. This is an example of the importance of
giving the appropriate weight to the de facto authority of a superior. When Akayesu used
his de facto authority to encourage his subordinates to kill members of the Tutsi tribe he
made himself responsible for the consequences. This is more logically probative of his
guilt than mere indicia (such as a badge or a uniform) of his cooperation with the
Rwandan Government. Chamber I held that there was insufficient evidence that the
Interahamwe 50 were subordinate to Akayesu, yet the Chamber found that he was
frequently seen with Silas Kubwimana, the head of the Interahamwe.51 The Chamber also
__________________________________________

48

Greg R. Vetter, supra note 21 at 134 n.259 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 18]

49

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 9 at paras 187 and 643 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 17]

50

Hutu militia

51

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 9 at para 187 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7]
9

acknowledged a specific example of his authority. He ordered the Interahamwe to make a
female undress in public, and the Chamber found him guilty under Article 6(1) of the
Statute for this conduct.52
A theme of the cases in Rwanda is that those charged under Article 6(3) already
had a high profile in the Commune, that attached to the regular administration of day-today life.53 From April to June 1994, their influence in the community was transferred to
the purposes of genocide. They used the power they possessed in the regular scheme of
social, economic and political relationships to encourage the eradication of the Tutsi
tribe. An example of how a defendant’s position and influence could be used to control
events during the genocide can be found in the case of Alfred Musema. He was the
Director of the Tea Factory in Gisovu, in the Prefecture of Kibuye.54 The Director’s
power stemmed from their control of economic resources.55 He employed many people,56
and provided social services such as clinics and schools.57 His power was magnified by
the poverty of the region.58 Factory Directors possessed more than economic power. They
also possessed social and political control of their employees.59
______________________________________________
52

Greg R. Vetter, supra note 21 at 135 n.275 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 18]

53

Prosecutor v. Musema, No. ICTR-96-13-I (ICTR January 27, 2000)
Many witnesses testified Alfred Musema was a figure of authority and influence, at para 868.
To hold a position controlling the distribution of resources included holding management positions in
parastatal organizations like the OCIR-the’, at para 872. Tea Factory Directors, through their concurrent
position in the OCIR-the’ were appointed by the President, and reported to the Managing Director of the
OCIR-the’, who in turn reported to the Ministry of Agriculture, at para 876.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9]

54

Id. at para 870

55

Id. at para 869

56

Id. at para 870

57

Id. at para 870

58

Id. at para 873

59

Id. at para 873
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The Trial Chamber in Musema followed Celebici on the application of the
superior-subordinate relationship to people in non-military positions of authority, stating
that the principle of command responsibility encompasses political leaders and other
civilian superiors.60 The Chamber found that Musema exercised de jure power and de
facto control over his Tea Factory employees, but was not satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that he had de jure or de facto control over the Kibuye Prefecture, OCIR the’, or
the ‘villageois’ plantation workers.61
The Trial Chamber applied Article 6(3) by inquiring where and when Tea Factory
employees committed acts described in Articles 2-4 of the ICTR.62 Musema incurred
individual criminal responsibility for the attack on Gitwa Hill because Tea Factory
Employees carried out atrocities there.63 He arrived at Rwirambo Hill in a red Pajero,
followed by four Daihatsu pickups from the Gisovu Tea Factory.64 As a consequence of
the attack he was found criminally responsible for their actions.65 Employees of the Tea
Factory were among the attackers on.Muyira Hill, and Musema was found guilty under
Article 6(3).66 During the attack on Muriya Hill, the evidence showed he raped a teacher
named Nyiramusugi.67 She was held down by four others while he committed this
_________________________
60

Id. at para 136 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9]

61

Id. at para 880

62

Id. at para 892

63

Id. at para 895

64

Id. at para 896

65

Id. at para 900

66

Id. at para 915

67

Id. at para 907
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crime.68 While he was found guilty under 6(1), he did not incur criminal responsibility for
this crime under 6(3), because none of the individuals who restrained her were Tea
Factory employees.69 This illustrates the distinction between having an opportunity to
influence individuals at a certain moment, and having actual authority to prevent or
punish the conduct of subordinates.
The leading regional civilian authority in the Rwandan system of social and
political organization is the Prefect. The Prefects are the premier administrative officials
of the Prefectures.70 They have hierarchical authority over bourgmestres, and Prefects can
requisition the Gendarmerie Nationale.71 Clement Kayishema was the Prefect of the
Kibuye Prefecture, and he was charged with war crimes under the ICTR.72
Addressing the requirements of Article 6(3), the Trial Chamber asked (a) to what
degree was Kayishema’s power de jure or de facto (b) who were his subordinates (c)
what was his degree of knowledge of their acts, and (d) did he fail to prevent or punish
those acts? 73 Bourgmestres, gendarmes, soldiers, communal police, prison wardens,
members of the Interahamwe, and armed civilians all committed criminal acts in Rwanda,
and all of these individuals were under the de jure or de facto control of the Prefect.74
_______________________________________

68

69

Id. at para 907[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9]
Id. at para 909

70

Prosecutor v. Kayishema, No. ICTR-95-1-T (May 21, 1999) at para 479 [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 8]

71

Id. at para 479

72

Id. at para 212

73

Id. at para 212

74

Id. at para 212
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The Defense argued that because of the chaos in Rwanda, the rule of law didn’t exist,
canceling out the Prefects de jure authority.75 Additionally, the expert witness for the
Defense, Professor Guibal, testified that the Prefect’s powers were emptied of real
meaning because the Ministers, the Prefects’ hierarchical superiors, were from a different
political party than the Prefect.76 The Trial Chamber rejected this argument, observing
that administrative bodies, law enforcement agencies, and civilians were working within
a common genocidal plan, and political rivalries were secondary.77
The Trial Chamber then addressed the argument that formal structures of
authority had broken down, dissolving the de jure power of the Accused, allegedly
destroying the superior-subordinate relationship.78 The Chamber held that military and
civilian leaders can be criminally responsible under the doctrine of command
responsibility on the basis of de facto, as well as de jure authority.79 The Chamber
concluded that persons “effectively in command of such more informal structures” may
be held responsible.80
Kayishema testified that in August 1992 he had been telephoned by the
Bourgmestre of the Gishyita Commune, who reported that houses were being burned
down and chaos reigned.81 The bourgmestre said “ I just want your presence here on the
___________________________
75

Id. at para 487 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8]

76

Id. at para 486

77

Id. at para 487

78

Id. at para 354

79

Id. at para 354

80

Id. at para 354

81

Id. at para 499
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spot.”82 This was construed as evidence of Kayishema’s de facto authority.83 The
Chamber decided he had de facto control over all of the assailants, and that he was
instrumental in transporting, orchestrating, instructing, and rewarding them for their
actions.84 Even if the Defense’s argument were accepted, the “mere absence” of legal
authority would not preclude the imposition of responsibility.85
It is clear that a breakdown in formal command structures does not reduce the
possibility that a de facto superior can be liable for the actions of subordinates. The
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia stated that because of the breakdown, it looked more
to the ability of a superior to in-fact control the actions of subordinates rather than formal
status to determine the existence of the superior-subordinate relationship, as long as the
control exercised is similar to that of military commanders.86 Defendants may be inclined
to use chaos as an excuse for their role in crimes against humanity. One of the tasks
involved in prosecuting defendants under the doctrine of command responsibility is to
prove that a given defendant used de jure or de facto authority to exploit the
circumstances, rather than allowing the defendant to create an impression that his or her
power was dissolved by the circumstances.
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B. INTERPRETATIONS OF “KNEW OR HAD REASON TO KNOW”.
The “knew or had reason to know” standard emerged from the trials of German
and Japanese commanders and civilian superiors after World War II. It has been a
contentious element of the doctrine of command responsibility.
The “duty to know” standard in customary law can be traced to the Yamashita
case.87 General Yamashita was the commander of the Japanese 14th Army Group in the
Philippines between October 9, 1944 and September 3,1945.88 Abuse and murder of
civilians and prisoners-of-war took place on a large scale.89 Yamashita argued that
American forces had disrupted his command and control, so he had no knowledge of the
crimes committed by his soldiers.90 There was no direct link between Yamashita and the
atrocities.91 The Prosecution based their arguments on the premise that he “must have
known” of their occurrence, because they were so widespread.92 The finding of guilt was
based on “all the facts and circumstances of the record.” 93
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Yamashita is one of the precedents for the proposition that if the crimes are
frequent and notorious in nature, it increases the likelihood that the commander knew or
should have known about them.94 For example, the Appeals Chamber in Celebici, in
affirming the decision of the Trial Chamber, observed that the widespread occurrence of
offenses, combined with the length of time over which they occurred, should have put
Mucic on notice about the atrocities.95
Whereas Yamashita used a “must have known” standard, the Nuremberg Tribunal
in the The High Command Case employed a “should have known” standard.96 Thirteen
high ranking German officials were charged with crimes against peace, crimes against
humanity, and conspiracy to commit those crimes.97 The court stated that:
[The commander’s] criminal responsibility is personal. The act or neglect to
act must be voluntary and criminal …There must be a personal dereliction that
can occur only where the act is directly traceable to him or where his failure to
properly supervise his subordinates constitutes criminal negligence on his
part.98
And further:
…the occupying commander must have knowledge of these offenses and
acquiesce or participate or criminally neglect to interfere in their
commission…99
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The language used, “personal dereliction” and “acquiescence”, indicates that the court
took the view that the superior must have actual knowledge of the criminal acts of
subordinates.100
This may be compared with The Hostage Case. General Field Marshall Wilhelm
List, commander of the German Army during the invasion and occupation of the Balkan
peninsula, was given “entire executive power” in Serbia by Hitler, and was charged with
the killing of large numbers of civilians, carried out as reprisals for insurgent activity.101
The court found liability based on the reports List had received from subordinates of
murders by units in the field.102 The court found that the commander had been given
notice when he “fail(ed) to require and obtain complete information.”103 This was held to
be a dereliction of duty, and he could not plead his own dereliction as a defense.104 The
Court recognized that knowledge is imputed by the reports.105 This is a precedent for the
view of the Celebici court, when it stated that the information a superior receives needn’t
“compel a conclusion” that the crimes are being, or will be carried out, it need only
indicate that further inquiry is necessary by the superior.106 The Hostage Case states
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that knowledge of crimes committed by subordinates may be constructive. Knowledge
may be presumed where reports of criminal activity are received at a commander’s
headquarters.107
The archetype of a civilian administrator who incurs command responsibility can
be found in the Eichmann case.108 He did not personally commit any war crimes. The
charges against him were brought because of his position as head of the Gestapo
department in Berlin responsible for the final solution.109 The Supreme Court of Israel
observed that:
he ordered and commanded…without orders from his superiors in
the hierarchy of the service…planning, enthusiasm of the
appellant and those who did his bidding…we are concerned with
the appellant’s individual guilt, and it has been proved he took his
place not only among those who were active in, but those who
activated the implementation of the final solution. [He] took a
leading part and had a central and decisive role.110
The knowledge a superior possesses or the knowledge that is expected of a superior
depends on the circumstances of each case. A lot of fact-finding is necessary in order to
discover what a particular superior knew or should have known. When the accumulation
of facts plays such an important role, it is not useful to create a legal rule which is too
restrictive. A flexible interpretation of the mens rea element of command responsibility is
desirable because it accommodates a case-by-case approach.
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(i) Expressions of the mens rea element in the codification of command responsibility
The first codification of the doctrine of command responsibility appeared in the
1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.111 Article 86, Paragraph 2
states:
The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was committed
by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal or disciplinary
responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or had information which
should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time, that
he was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if they did not
take all feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the
breach.112
Protocol I provided a model for the ICTY and ICTR Statutes.113
What sources of knowledge are suggested by the phrase “had information
which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time…”? The
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia stated that superiors possess the mens rea for
command responsibility where they have actual knowledge, and the burden is on
Prosecution to show it by direct or circumstantial evidence.114 The court then listed a
series of indicia of actual knowledge. They include: the number and type of illegal acts,
the scope of the acts, the time when they occurred, the number and type of troops,
logistics, geographic location, widespread occurrence, tactical tempo, methods used in
similar illegal acts, the staff involved, and the location of commander.115 The Celebici
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court concluded that a superior can be held criminally responsible only if information
was available to him which would provide notice of offenses committed by subordinates,
which did not necessarily have to mean information of the crimes themselves, but
information sufficient to warrant further inquiry.116 The Appeals Chamber reiterated the
Trial Chamber’s reasoning, when it concluded that “knew or had reason to know” means
information of a general nature was available, which would put the superior on notice of
offenses.117
Command responsibility is also codified in Article 28 of the International
Criminal Court Statute, also known as the Rome Statute.118
Command responsibility for non-military superiors is covered separately from
military commanders. Article 28(2)(a) states:
[a superior is criminally responsible where]…the superior either knew,
or consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated, that the
subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes.119
This differs from the standard for military commanders, which retains the “knew, or
should have known standard.”120 This may be an acknowledgement that military
commanders, because of their command duties, are ordinarily more likely to be in a
position where they “should have known”of the activities of their subordinates, but the
non-military superior standard in the Rome Statute still recognizes that civilian superiors
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can be put on notice that will lead to criminal responsibility.121
(ii) The Approach of the ICTY and ICTR to the mens rea of command responsibility
It has regularly been stated that the mens rea of command responsibility has not
been clearly defined. It is also stated with regularity that the characteristics of command
responsibility involve accommodating each case on it’s own particular facts. A certain
degree of flexibility in the mens rea requirement is therefore reasonable, and it should not
be deemed essential to establish a narrowly focused mens rea requirement – in other
words, “the fact that the exact mens rea requirement is ambiguous is not necessarily
troubling.”122
The report of the Commission of Experts on the Former Yugoslavia endorsed
a flexible approach to the mens rea of command responsibility:
It is the view of the Commission that the mental element necessary …
is (a) actual knowledge, (b) such serious personal dereliction on the
part of the commander as to constitute willful and wanton disregard
of the possible consequences, or (c) an imputation of constructive
knowledge, that is, despite pleas to the contrary, the commander,
under the facts and circumstances of the particular case, must have
known of the offenses charged and acquiesced therein.123
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There must be specific information in fact available to him, but willful blindness is no
excuse, (distinguished from ignorance caused by a failure to supervise, which would not
easily result in criminal responsibility.)124 These words from The Hostage Case illustrate
willful blindness:
If [the commander] fails to require and obtain complete information,
the dereliction of duty rests upon him and he is in no position to plead
his own dereliction as a defense.125
The superior is deemed to be “at fault in having failed to acquire such
knowledge.”126 An example can be found in the behavior of Mucic, the Celebici camp
commander, who by removing himself from the premises of the camp, willfully sought to
avoid knowledge.127
The Tribunal for Rwanda has endorsed the approach of the Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, particularly the approach taken in the Celebici case. Despite the fact
that Chamber I did not find Jean-Paul Akayesu criminally responsible under the count of
command responsibility, they stated that it is “proper to ensure there has been malicious
intent, or at least, ensure that negligence was so serious as to be tantamount to
acquiescence or even malicious intent”128 Likewise, the Chamber in the Musema case
found that the mens rea for a superior is malicious intent, or at least negligence so serious
as to be tantamount to acquiescence.129 The Trial Chamber in Kayishema followed the
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guidelines of the Rome Statute for the mens rea of civilian superiors.130 They must have
“[known] or consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated that the
subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes.” 28(2)(a) Rome
Statute.131 The Chamber said the Prosecution must prove that the accused either knew, or
consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated or put him on notice that his
subordinates had committed, or were about to commit acts in breach of Articles 2 to 4 of
this Tribunal’s Statute.132
The Chamber applied the civilian standard for command responsibility from the
Rome Statute, and found the Accused guilty under that standard. Kayishema was
personally involved to a heavy degree in the massacres at the Stadium in Kibuye Town,
the Catholic Church and Home St. Jean and Complex, and in the Bisesero area.133 While
he was present at the Mubuga Church, the evidence didn’t show he specifically ordered
the attacks that took place there.134 The civilian “knowledge” standard contained in the
Rome Statute was still sufficient for a finding of guilt.135 The court reasoned that the
Tutsis were being attacked throughout Rwanda at that time, and Kayishema, by virtue of
his position as Prefect of Kiuye, was privy to this information.136
The Rwanda Tribunals interpretation of the mens rea requirement of command
responsibility is similar to the approach taken by the Yugoslavia Tribunal. Proceeding on
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the circumstances of each case, if the superior either knew or consciously avoided
knowledge of the criminal acts of subordinates, the mens rea requirement will be
satisfied.
(iii) The mens rea element of command responsibility in United States v. Medina.
Another example of the application of the doctrine of command responsibility
may be found in a case which arose out of the war in Vietnam, United States v.
Medina.137 At issue was the standard of knowledge that should be applied to Captain
Ernst Medina, whose Company slaughtered between 150 and 400 hundred unarmed
civilians in the hamlet of My Lai in Vietnam.138
Captain Medina was the superior of William L. Calley, Jr., who was charged
with ordering his men to kill civilians, and participating in the killings at My Lai.139
Captain Medina’s headquarters was 150 meters from the village.140 He was charged with
manslaughter under Article 119(b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.141 Under
U.S. policy, he was not charged with violations of the law of war, but under the Code.142
He argued that he was unaware of the commission of the crimes until it was too late.143
___________________________________________________

137

Major Michael L. Smidt, supra note 88 at 211 n.222 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
16]
138

Id. at 212

139

M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 91 at 434 n.179 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 20]

140

Major Michael L. Smidt, supra note 88 at 190 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 16]

141

Id. at 193

142

Id. at 194

143

Cristopher Crowe, supra note 99 at 222 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13]

24

A strict standard of actual knowledge was espoused by military Judge Colonel Kenneth
Howard. He gave an instruction to the jury stating that a commander is responsible under
the doctrine of command responsibility if he has actual knowledge, and he has
wrongfully failed to act.144 He told the jury it is essential that a commander know
his subordinates are committing, or are about to commit atrocities.145 Captain Medina
was found not guilty. However, the Army Field Manual describes a “knew or should
have known”standard:
[Command] responsibility arises directly when the acts in question
have been committed in pursuance of an order of the commander
concerned. The commander is also responsible if he has actual
knowledge, or should have knowledge, through reports received by
him or through other means, that troops or other persons subject to his
control are about to commit or have committed a war crime and he
fails to take the necessary and reasonable steps to insure compliance
with the law of war or to punish violators thereof.146
The language of the Army Field Manual clearly includes a “should have known” element,
allowing for constructive knowledge, rather than the strict standard applied in Medina.
The actual knowledge standard employed was similar to that used in The High Command
Case, rather than the imputed knowledge standard used in The Hostage Case147 or the
“must have known” standard in Yamashita. The approach of Judge Howard in Medina
was influenced by the United States Manual for Courts-Martial which states that merely
witnessing a crime without intervention does not impose criminal culpability on a
commander. Inaction can only lead to culpability if the commander’s failure to act is
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intended to encourage the subordinates. This approach fails to account for the dereliction
of duty that occurs when a commander is present during the commission of atrocities by
his subordinates. The Medina case illustrates that a flexible approach to the mens rea
requirement of command responsibility also gives leeway to interpret the requirement in
a restrictive way. There exists an unresolved tension between cases which allow
constructive knowledge (eg The Hostage Case) and those which interpret the knowledge
element strictly (Medina).

C. THE FAILURE TO TAKE NECESSARY AND REASONABLE MEASURES TO
PREVENT OR PUNISH.
Witness testimony showed that Jean-Paul Akayesu ordered and participated
in, and failed to prevent the killing in the Taba Commune.148 He argued at his trial that he
was powerless to stop the atrocities from being committed.149 There was evidence that
before April 18 1994, he had attempted to prevent violence from taking place.150
However, there was a change in his behavior after that date, following a meeting
of bourgmestres, including the Prime Minister, who read a prepared policy speech and
threatened bourgmestres with dismissal or violent reprisals if they did not cooperate with
the genocide.151 Akayesu argued that after this occasion, he was overwhelmed, and
witnesses for the Defense testified the Interahamwe threatened to kill him if he did not
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cooperate with them.152 There was substantial evidence that after April 18 he collaborated
with them, particularly Silus Kubwimana, head of the Interahamwe.153 The Chamber
found beyond a reasonable doubt that he chose to collaborate with the Interahamwe.154
The failure to take reasonable and necessary measures to prevent or punish the
acts of subordinates is the element which is at the moral core of the doctrine of command
responsibility. When individuals accept social, political, economic, or military power,
there is an assumption that they will not fail to accept the responsibilities of the position
they occupy.
There are compelling policy reasons for the superior’s duty. Military and
civilian leaders are in a position of great public trust and responsibility, and they
voluntarily assume their positions. They may be presumed to have knowingly agreed to
the duties under international law that go along with such positions,155 and they are the
people best situated to prevent atrocities.156
The ability to prevent or punish the actions of subordinates is linked to the
individual facts of each case, but it is not sufficient to argue that an attempt to do
something would have been futile. This is a humanitarian concern.
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In the Hostage Case, it was stated that:
an officer who merely stands by while his subordinates execute a
criminal order of his superiors which he knows is criminal violates a
moral obligation under international law. By doing nothing he cannot
wash his hands of international responsibility. 157
The Celebici court cited the example of the Rape of Nanking.158 The Tokyo
Tribunal placed criminal responsibility on Japanese Foreign Minister Hirota, finding that
“he received reports of atrocities immediately after the entry of the Japanese forces into
Nanking”159 The Tokyo Tribunal found Hirota “derelict in his duty in not insisting …that
immediate action be taken to put an end to the atrocities…His inaction amounted to
criminal negligence.”160
What should be the practical response, when a defendant proposes the argument
offered by Jean-Paul Akayesu? The court in Celebici declined to announce a general
standard regarding the failure to take reasonable and necessary measures to prevent or
punish, but did state that the superior is responsible for failing to take such measures that
are “within material possibility”.161 Article 86(2) of the Rome Statute uses the language
“all feasible measures”.162
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When a superior is faced with the dilemma of being coerced, or receiving orders that
conflict with their legal duty, the High Command Case advocates the following choices:
(1) issue an order countermanding the order (2) resign (3) sabotage the enforcement of
the order even if it this can only be done within a limited sphere.163 The “failure to
prevent or punish” element of the doctrine of command responsibility is based in the
moral responsibilities which accompany positions of military and civilian power. The
grant of power to an individual includes a duty to promote humanitarian principles,
especially in times of crisis and chaos.
If a war crimes have been committed by individuals who were under the
effective control of a civilian superior, who knew or had reason to know of the criminal
acts, and who failed to prevent, halt, or punish those acts, the civilian superior may be
found to be criminally liable under the doctrine of command responsibility.
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